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It’s a pleasure to be here, and we had a great morning session.  We had different
views about where our economy is going from a macro standpoint, and we had an
exciting session with new leaders who are creating an extremely interesting part of the
economy and business; they are the sources of our hope.  I wish I were at least 30 years
younger, because I would have been speaking more of the same -- not as eloquently as
Mikitani-san or Abe-san did -- but seriously telling the joke of the corporation that is
currently going through major difficulties n convincing the market that “we’ll be back.”
It was in 1969, only 8 years after the first Xe ographic copier, called the 914, was
introduced.  Xerox stock, yes -- I forgot what it was -- it was not as high as Yahoo but
almost as high.  At that time, there was an expression called “Castro money,” and there
were lots of high flying stocks and Xerox was one of them.   The stock made University
of  Rochester extremely rich because they had financed Xerox when Xerox was
struggling in earlier years without really knowing that Xerox stock would become very
valuable.  Xerox was trying to buy other businesses, using their shares like AOL did with
Time Warner, so history sort of repeats its lf.  What we are seeing now is maybe a little
extreme.  But we’ve seen  similar days in Japan.
Fuji Xerox was formed as a joint venture with Fuji Photo Film and Rank Xerox;
Fuji was probably more solid and seemingly richer than the partner.  Financially, in
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Fuji Film Bank; it has always been an extremely solid company.  Fuji Photo and Rank
Xerox formed a joint venture in 1962, and the JV was helped by the economy that was
really growing very fast in the 1960’s.  Of course, it was not the internet then, but most
Japanese businesses were very interested in modernizing the way they do business.  At
that time, the keys to modernization, particularly the office environment, were computers
or sometimes even crude versions of c mputers, and copiers.  Xerox was on top of the
copier market, so Fuji Xerox grew like anything. At  that time, Fuji Photo was still
struggling to carve out new business areas for themselves.  They were also struggling
with their own competition, Eastman Kodak.  It’s really changed: Kodak is struggling
with Fuji Photo Film now.  But at that time, Fuji Photo was struggling and Fuji Photo
even readily accepted that there had to be  negative price premium in order to sell
effectively against Eastman Kodak, at least 10 to 15%.
So Fuji Xerox, when it really started to grow, was being referred to as the “gol en
egg” for Fuji Photo Film.  We grew almost as fast as Mr. Mikitani’s company, Rakuten
Ichiba.  We have remained private; we never went to an IPO, and if we had I wouldn’t be
standing here.  I would be vacationing somewhere, having retired a long, long time ago.
Unfortunately we didn’t have the foresight of going to the market,  but we grew and
grew.  In the early 70’s, some publications in Japan ran annual lists of the most popular
companies in the eyes of the graduating class of those years. When asked, “Which
companies do you want to work for?”, embarrassingly, though we were less than ten
years old, we were ranked in the top five, and our parent company was way down the list.
All of our big customers -- Tokyo Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, then separate, and Hitachi --
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were really buying something, saw something in Fuji Xerox.  It was a dream, something
they did not see in other established companies.  And when we ran  advertising
campaign in 1971 called “Beautiful,” things went wild, and when we first ran the
television series it was interesting.  Young people felt, what is this ad?  What is this
growing company?   It featured a hippie going through a street with the placard,  but no
commercial message was aired at the end of sixty seconds, simply Fuji Xerox, nothing
about the products.  So all the right decision-makers were saying this company must be
crazy; they are wasting their money.  On the other hand, young people were saying this is
a very strange, interesting, and exciting company.  So we started to receive really young,
exciting, forward-looking people, despite the fact that we were stilla very, very small
start up company.
Today, you know the picture has totally reversed.  Professor Patrick referred to
our company as one of the medium-sized established companies.  We have a reasonable
rating or assessment from the right decision-makers.  They know who we are and they
know we are pretty solid -- but in the eyes of young people we have totally disappeared.
We are not exciting, we aren’t fun, we aren’t even on the market.  Now, the whole point
of my coming out with this is that changes have been with us, and we are now once again
in the midst of new changes. We don’t know whether the so-called Internet change is
fundamentally different from the changes we have gone through.  Maybe it is a
fundamental change.  Yet while it may be a bit different, but fundamentally  could be the
same as all the changes we have all gone through.  We will see what the r sults will be of
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many companies.
The key topic of this corporate restructuring is the fundamental question: Why do
you have to restructure your company or industry?  If everything is going well and the
outlook is okay, you don’t have to change.  But in Japan that’s not the situation for most
companies.  Basically, there are two reasons why corporations are going through
restructuring.  Number one is simply to be more efficient, more competitive in whatever
market you are in.  That’s number one.  But the other area is a question of corporate
governance.  That’s a very important area of restructuring for many Japanese companies.
Starting with the first, there is no magical way to be profitable, productive, or
competitive.  Profitability and productivity are functions of output and input.  I know
there are many companies in this country, and in Japan, which are not even profitable and
yet enjoy a very high market value.  I don’t know whether that will continue, but
basically in the long run you have to make profits to be able to continue to do business
into the future, invest into the future, do something interesting, daring.  You just cannot
continue borrowing from the market.  The typical model of many Japanese corporations,
even when they were winning the international competition, was that they were winning
largely on the basis of their effectiveness in the marke place.  Whether that’s
automobiles, copiers, fax machines or whatever, their profitability and productivity in
most cases have never been higher than their counterparts in the United States.
The rate of productivity increase has always been higher on our part, but i terms
of profitability, most leading Japanese companies have never been more profitable, never
been more productive than their foreign counterparts.  This actually teaches you one
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level.  However, the conditions under which we operated really changed drastically in the
80’s and particularly in the 90’s.  The first very important source of our capital isbanks.
They have had to change their ways of doing things.  They just could not go on lending
money where a profit was not to be promised.  They had to be more selective.  They
were challenged for their own base of existence.
So, a lot of companies have started to do res ructuring very much like the Jack
Welch way.  Jack Welch is followed very closely by a lot of Japanese executives. Two
days ago there was an article, which maybe many of you have read.  I think the President
of ANA, Mr. Nomura, was being quoted and he said Jack Welch would go for six sigma
but that “it’s often quoted but never followed, implemented.”   Actually, this is a very
important point and even Mr. Lapin, who represented GE in Japan, was quoted as saying
“Well, you just cannot do what Jack Welch did at GE in Japan.”  Not exactly.  And the
reason is employment.  Over the years, I have never counted the numbers, bu  the article
says Mr. Welch fired 200,000 people.  Of course, he was saying it’s not an easy decision.
He was saying it is only the customers who can actually maintain secure employment for
a company.  It’s a nice way of saying it, maybe passing the buck to the consumers, but
still, I look at his record at GE.  It’s difficult to refute what he has achiev d.  But it is also
true that companies cannot act as aggressively, as boldly, as drastically on the
employment situation in Japan.
Let’s take NTT.  We all agree that the access charge is high.  I don’t want to be
technical because I don’t know.  Also, partly because I’m  a board member of NTT, so
although I don’t know very much, I cannot disclose to you what little that I do know.
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220,000 people and its subsidiary DoCoMo is making lots of money, and their market
capitalization is top, ahead of its parent company.   NTT is the second largest company in
market capitalization.  NTT Data is lso high on the list.   Mr. Son’s company, Softbank,
is the third.  The NTT group as a whole is profitable, but really profitable companies
within the group such as DoCoMo and Data only employ 30,000 of the 220,000.  The
nitty gritty of NTT telephone business employs 190,000 people.  This is where price
reductions, whether in access charges or fixed charges or internet, will have a m jor
employment effect.
Now, I’m not trying to protect NTT’s position, bu  y u are businessmen, and NTT
is currently enjoying a pretty good share price.  In the long run NTT knows it can be
competitive; it can beat the NCCs by cutting prices.  It has to be careful about the  Fair
Trade Commission, but NTT has muscle.  If I were the president, and if I didn’t have the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications on my back, I would probably talk to my
shareholders, and say I’ve had this problem too long, I’d like to be on my own, I would
be aggressive.  Of course, we would observe the laws but we will beat he NCCs in the
market on an equal competitive basis.  We may lose some profits, and you may lose some
of your share price for the time being, ut we’ll come back in two years time.  We’ll
probably be a much stronger player in the market.  Your shares will be much healthier.
But of course, I’m not the president of NTT and Mr. Miyazu doesn’t have the freedom to
talk as I do.   The big question remains; what to do about employment?  In most of the
restructuring exercises done in sizable Japanese corporations, this employment question
is the most difficult and painful issue.  At most companies, therefore, at least in the next
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profitability, productivity, measured as ROE, EVA.   Not necessarily tr ing to maximize
shareholder value all the time, but still increasing  a reasonable time the value to
shareholders.  But are they going all the way to 20% ROE, 30% ROE?  If you know you
can cut your employment by 30%, you can probably do it.  Would you do it in the United
States?  Probably the answer is yes and no.  There are more yes’s in this country than
no’s, but in Japan there are more no’s than yes’s.  And that process is slow…but it is
going in the right direction.
Then, of course, there is a group of companies which really have no choice but to
cut their employment.  They don’t have the luxury of balancing profitability and
maintaining employment security.  We are seeing  it in companies like Nissan-Renault.
When they announced their plan to cut employment and sell non-core assets, they
shocked the community.  Interestingly however, the initial shock is gone.  Of course, they
still have to go through the difficulties of implementing their plans.  Mr. Hanawa, the
President of Nissan, is a very decentand very international person.  He ran Nissan USA
for some time, and he and I served as Vice Chairman of Keizai Doyukai (Japan
Association of Corporate Executives) wh n my predecessor Ushio was the Chairman.  I
had one occasion to breakfast with him when we had something to discuss; this was after
Mr. Ghosn had come and announced Nissan’s aggressive restructuring plan.  I thought
Hanawa-san must be in a very serious phase and agonizing.  However, he looked
unusually relieved and relaxed. I found the reason was that Hanawa-s n had specifically
asked for Mr. Ghosn, to Mr.Schweitzer, head of Renault, saying “he’s the man we want.”
Mr. Ghosn restructured Renault successfully in a very short period of time after having
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Schweitzer’s hesitancy, he came.  The second reason that Hanawa-san was pleased was
that Mr. Ghosn’s arrival and his initial observations and initial rough plans to rationalize
Nissan found lots of friends and sympathizers within Nissan’s mid to lower management,
the group in the 40’s, and Mr. Ghosn happens to be about 45 or 46.  That was interesting.
There had been a lot of inner movements within Nissan.  They really wanted to change
the culture, change the way of doing things: purchasing,  manufacturing, styling,
advertising, dealing with a lot of vendors including Fuji Xerox.  But somehow, tho e
young people just could not find their recommendations impleme ted as quickly and or
boldly as they wanted.  So Mr. Ghosn arrives.  So this was not the French-born Japanese
plan forced upon Nissan.  There was some element of that but basically what Nissan-
Renault announced was a plan that young people in Nissan had wanted to do for a long
time.  If they had done it ten years ago there would have been pain, but not as strenuous,
not as drastic as the pain that a lot of people who are being effected are now going
through…vendors, communities, of course their own employees.
Restructuring is being helped by a couple of factors.  Belatedly, but surely, as I
said earlier, most Japanese corporate executives have shifted their emphasis from a size
obsession, revenue obsession, market share obsession, to shareholder-oriented
profitability and productivity.   The question of customer loyalty is almost as highly
regarded as the question of corporate ethics, and the Doyukai survey of our members
clearly indicates this shift. Secondly, there is a changing attitude on the part of young
people.  For example, Mr. Mikitani of Rakuten Ichiba was introduced as a former IBJ
person.
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skilled and talented people went.  Lots of talented people went into financial institutions.
There was even a time when major banks were ven recruiting from science and
engineering majors of major universities.  They had too many.  On the other hand, if you
go to small businesses they will complain, “We just don’t have the people!”  Now a
major shift is underway.  A lot of talented people in the major manufacturing or financial
institutions, many of them financed by their employers, come to get MBAs from Harvard,
Stanford, Columbia.  We have many such MBAs, but I’d say about 50% of them have not
been fully utilized.  They have been told, “You have been chosen for our fast track.
Don’t get impatient.  You’ll get a chance.  Think about those people who never had a
chance to go overseas.” But in this world of fast changes, where one business practice
learned a couple of years ago can be obsolete, y u really have to put what you learn into
practice very soon.  It’s quite natural that young people get impatient.  So, they start
leaving their employers and they go join other companies, foreign companies, small
companies, even small businesses who are now in the hands of the third generation,
fourth generation.  They are different from the past.  Some of them have MBAs.  Even if
they don’t, hey know the value of good MBAs, people pay quite well for those who
come from big businesses.  It is a restructuring of not only a single company, but it’s
happening across the industries, and across big business and small business.  It’s a very
encouraging sign.
Fuji has just lost one excellent MBA candidate.  She was very bright and talented.
She went to Stanford to earn her MBA.  But she also had a knack for computers and she
wanted to go for the double degree.  We don’t have very many who can go for double
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degrees.  Our personnel office said, “No, Mr. Chairman, we’ll be setting a wrong
example.” and I said, “Let’s take a chance.  If she comes back with the MBA and a
computer science degree we will have a super person who will be leading some of our
new businesses.”  Several weeks ago I received a letter, “Mr. Kobayashi, I must tell you I
have an irresistible offer from my classmate.  This is my once in a lifetime opportunity,
therefore I cannot return to Fuji Xerox.”
Well, this happens, and I regret I had made the decision to let her go through the
double degree program.    If you try to be a little more philosophical, this is one sign that
the Japanese professional labor market is moving, and being productive.  One day we will
have somebody like her join us.  And you know, it’s t just losing, we’ll be gaining
some.
This positive labor market and professional market movement is happening.  Then
even on the legal side, th re are certain laws that are being passed to make it easy for
businesse  to restructure holding companies and the other arrangements.  It is unfortunate
that the government has postponed the introduction of the axation system on the
consolidated basis.  It is really a shame, although I basically support what Prime Minister
Obuchi has been doing.  This is one of a couple of things that we, Keizai Doyukai, and I
personally, criticize him for failing to live up to, not only a promise, but as something
that really slows down the necessary restructuring process.  As far as Fuji Xerox is
concerned, we’re not really at the stage of having our backs against the wall, but we are
really pressed against the competition.  We really have to do a lot better.  We aren’t doing
anything magical.  We are going through, number one, the changing of our business
areas, shifting our resources to business areas which we think are more strategically
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advantageous for us.  We also are cutting down o  the numbers of people, not by laying
off, but by the attrition process and early retirement; and we are trying to improve our
productivity.  We are also aggressively looking at new business opportunities where we
can actually put our money and other resources.  We will certainly welcome any
suggestions.  Of course, I’ll be picking Mr. Mikitani’s brain and others for that.  But let
me come back to the whole restructuring that’s going on in Japan.
The other area that I will briefly mention, a d then stop, is corporate governance.
The board structure is being changed in a number of Japanese companies, some are
reducing the board size and inviting outside board members.   The direction is right, but
I’m not really sure that many of those outside independent directors are given the
freedom that many of the independent directors have on the boards of US corporations.
Still, I remain positive about the outlook.  One thing which is unique in Japan is that we
have the company position of statutory auditor; and that’s part of the law.  There’s an
argument, a debate as to whether  a truly effective audit can be done either by the
statutory auditors or by an audit committee  ade up by independent directors, the US
way.  My feeling is that we can probably combine the two.  We will live with the
statutory audit system as it is part of our commercial code, but so w  will invite outside
board members to the board so that the board, and, of course, most importantly, the
management can really benefit from the different views.  And, if we can actually
combine, that might produce  som  interesting structure for the Japanese version of
corporate governance.
I anticipate this trend will proceed faster, and may be accelerated this year and
next because globalization is making it more  important for most Japanese corporations,
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particularly those with global/international exposure, to have that structure, to be able to
exercise their businesses effectively in the global market.
